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Governance Matter: Morningstar Stewardship Grades and 
Mutual Fund Performance 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Mutual fund investors have the arduous task of disentangling luck from ability 
of mutual fund managers’ performance. In this paper we investigate the role of 
mutual fund corporate governance (measured by Morningstar Stewardship grade) in 
mutual fund performance. We propose an objective data-driven corporate governance 
score based on principal components of Morningstar Stewardship Grades. 
Furthermore, we establish corporate governance scores have Granger Causality on 
long-term risk-adjusted returns. The findings suggest that corporate governance 
grades of mutual funds carry information content beyond the usual star rating 
measures for predicting long-term mutual fund performance and provide an effective 
tool for selecting funds. 
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1 Introduction 
 “Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters 
as not for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from 
having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company” (Adam Smith, 1776, Wealth of Nation, 
pages 700) 
 
Mutual fund investors have the daunting task of choosing which funds to invest in 
from thousands of available funds. The literature suggests that investors should fathom the 
future (short-term) performance of the funds based on current available evidence (Grinblatt 
and Titman, 1992, Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1993, Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1994, 
Brown and Goetzmann, 1995, Elton, Gruber and Blake, 1996, Carhart, 1997). Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argue corporate governance of that mutual fund such as board structure is 
less important than usual corporations since mutual fund investors use fund flow to 
discipline managers: they punish poor-performing managers by withdrawing flows and 
reward good managers with new flows into funds. 
In this paper, we explore the role of Morningstar Stewardship Grades (a corporate 
governance score for mutual funds) in mutual funds. Different from Stewardship Grades, 
Morningstar Star Ratings have been widely used by retail and institutional investors alike 
as tools for selecting mutual funds. Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) show significantly large 
inflows in response to rating upgrades or initiation of top rating. Several papers propose 
the use of Star Ratings as a performance measure. Blake and Morey (2000) focus on 
gauging the predictive ability of these ratings. It was documented that poor Star Ratings 
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indeed indicate weak future performance but good ratings were rarely followed by superior 
returns for a sample of funds rated by Morningstar between 1992 and 1997 (Blake and 
Morey, 2000). Subsequent work examining funds rated after June 20022 found that best-
rated funds outperform lower-rated funds over a three-year post-rating period (Morey and 
Gottesman, 2006). 
In the research we examine how Stewardship Ratings serve as performance 
indicator for mutual fund performance especially during the financial crisis. The eruptions 
of the 2003 U.S. mutual fund scandals that involved late trading, market timing and other 
irregularities put corporate governance of mutual funds in the spotlight, and subsequently 
led to a series of regulatory reforms. One interesting development that ensued was the 
launch of the Morningstar Fiduciary Grades (renamed the Stewardship Grades in 2005) 
which evaluated funds based not on their past performance, but on their standard of 
corporate governance. Stewardship Grades, ranging from A (best) to F (worst), are 
calculated as the aggregate scores of five components – Corporate Culture, Board Quality, 
Manager Incentives, Fees and Regulatory History (cf. Morningstar, 2007). 
Interest in the corporate governance of the mutual funds themselves is of a more 
recent vintage. Wellman and Zhou (2007) examine the role of the Stewardship Grades on 
mutual fund performance. They document that funds with top Stewardship Grade 
outperform those with poor grades by 19 to 23 basis points per month over the period Jan 
2001 – July 2004, and by 10 to 16 basis points over the period September 2004 – December 
2004. They find that among the five stewardship components, only Fees and Board Quality 
                                                 
2 Morningstar changes its rating methodology in June 2002. 
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exhibit significant explanatory power. A recent work by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) 
shows evidence that better governance is associated with fees that are more aligned with 
fund performance. Navone (2011) find that funds with better Board Quality grade is 
associated with less aggressive fees re-pricing by fund companies, although there is no 
evidence that better Board Quality grades translate into lower expense ratio. Zhou and 
Wang (2011) study the role governance plays in mutual fund voting. Chen and Huang 
(2011) employ both OLS regression and quantile regressions to examine the 
contemporaneous relation between fund performance and corporate governance using both 
overall Stewardship Grades and two stewardship component grades – Manager Incentive 
and Board Quality. While OLS regression reveal a strong contemporaneous association 
between overall Stewardship Grade and fund performance, they do not find evidence of 
any relation between performance and any of the stewardship components. 
Controversially, with OLS regressions Gottesman and Morey (2012) find no evidence that 
any of the stewardship components can consistently predict future performance.  
We do not directly use Morning Star Stewardship Rating rather we construct an 
objective data-driven objective corporate governance score using principal component 
method. Our research thus provides the most powerful tests on predictive power of 
Stewardship Ratings on mutual fund performance, thus contributing to this debate3 on the 
effectiveness of mutual fund corporate governance.  
                                                 
3 Casavecchia and Tooman (2012) investigate how governance of Stewardship Ratings is associated with 
managerial herding behavior. Lai, Tiwari and Zhang (2010) find that funds with bad boards, a negative past 
performance is strongly predictive of future negative performance while following poor performance, funds 
with better boards are more likely to change their fund strategy compared to funds with bad boards. 
Kurniawan, How and Verhoeven (2012) explore whether governance matters to fund style drift. They show 
that style-drift is negatively related to individual stewardship components such as Board Quality, Fees 
Structure and Regulatory History. 
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The salient factors in corporate governance that affect firm value cannot be 
observed in isolation, in this paper we explore the main drivers controlling for other factors. 
The main objective of our study is to address the dearth of research in possibly predictive 
determinants of mutual fund ratings by investigating how well Stewardship Grades can 
predict future Star Ratings, and hence future fund performance. We address potential 
econometric issues like endogeneity associated with predictive regressions of panel data 
with a Two-stage Least Squares framework, and hence, dynamic panel data regressions to 
capture the feed-back dynamics of the relationship in a more comprehensive way.  
In a panel data model, we find consistent predictability of US mutual fund 
performance using both monthly and yearly Stewardship Grades after controlling for fund 
specific characteristics. In the monthly data, we find that Stewardship Grades, while being 
quite persistent, does indeed Granger cause long term performance measures like the Star 
Rating. 
From the yearly panel data, we have several key findings. First, using Principal 
Component Analysis, we propose an effective yet procedure agnostic score based on the 
five components of the Stewardship as the first principal component (Baker and Wurgler, 
2006)4. Second, employing a naïve fixed effects model, we establish a strong predictive 
relationship between corporate governance and risk adjusted four-factor alpha (besides the 
Star Rating) after adjusting for possible endogeneity bias. Third, with the use of a dynamic 
                                                 
4 The first principal component that we calculate based on the total variation of the full 79 monthly data is 
FPC=0.35Board Quality+0.65Corporate Culture+0.37Fee Score+0.09Manager incentive+0.55Regulatory 
History. The loadings are almost the same up to second place for 7 yearly December data. We acknowledge 
that there is some level of selection in the data, however, the closeness of the yearly and monthly 
proportions give us enough credibility. The results are a little different after 2007 (not reported here) with 
Board Quality weighted down while Managerial Incentive is increased. 
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panel data model, we demonstrate that even in the presence of lagged performance 
measures, a strong relationship between Stewardship Grades and performance holds. 
Our findings lend credence to the view that the Morningstar Stewardship Grades 
supplement the Star Rating as a mutual fund evaluation tool and are particularly effective 
during crisis periods.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a description and 
some statistics of the data we employ. Section 3 presents the methodology we use and 
Section 4 reports our findings. In Subsection 4.1, we explore the out-of-sample 
predictability of performance with the Star Rating and Stewardship. We discuss the 
relationship of short term performance and Stewardship in Subsection 4.2. In Subsection 
4.3, we investigate the predictive panel regressions of the dynamic models. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
2 Data 
Morningstar provided monthly Star Ratings, including the 3-year, 5-year and 10-
year ratings (whichever available5) and Stewardship Grades. We further obtained all 
Stewardship Grade components (Corporate Culture or CC, Board Quality or BQ, Fees 
Score or FS, Manager Incentive or MI and Regulatory History or RH), important fund 
information like average and longest manager tenure and various fund classifications, over 
the period November 2004 – May 2011. For simplicity and for subsequent reference, we 
                                                 
5 Funds whose age is 3 – 5 years will receive a 3-year rating; funds with age 5 – 10 years will receive a 5-
year rating; those with age 10 years or longer will receive a 10-year rating. The overall Morningstar rating 
is derived from a weighted sum of these ratings. More details can be found in Morningstar Factsheets on 
Ratings and Appendix. 
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shall enumerate the months as follows: November 2004 is month 1, December 2004 month 
2 and so on, with the last month, May 2011 being Month 79.  
We merge the Morningstar data with the Centre for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund database. The CRSP database includes the 
Fama-French-Carhart’s four factors (Carhart, 1997), monthly total returns, monthly total 
net assets, quarterly expenses, quarterly portfolio turnover, date of inception and a ‘Dead 
Fund Flag’ that indicates whether the fund has ceased to exist. We include only funds 
whose fund identifiers from Morningstar (identifier = ‘Ticker’) and CRSP (Fund Identifier 
= ‘Nasdaq’) databases match. Only three funds are identified as ‘Dead’ fund.  
Table 1 displays the frequency distributions of Star Ratings (Panel A) and 
Stewardship Grade (Panel B) for the January samples. We select only funds that receive 
both Star Rating and Stewardship Grade over the sample period6. We observe that only a 
small percentage of funds receive the best and worst mutual find ratings and Stewardship 
Grades. We can also observe an asymmetry in the proportions with the best grades 
proportions outnumbering the worst ones. This phenomenon can be assigned to both the 
selection issue and the non-imposition of a symmetric bell curve structure on the scores. 
For Stewardship Grades, the percentage of funds that receive the top grade of ‘A’ ranges 
from 6.1% to 10.2% compared to 9.66% to 16.46% for top star rate funds. For the worst 
grade of ‘F’, the proportions are 0.8% to 3.69% as compared to 1.93% to 6.7% 1-star rated 
funds. The two-way frequencies for both ratings in Panel C reveals that Star Rating and 
                                                 
6 Choosing only funds that have both Stewardship Grade and Star Rating does entail some level of selection 
bias in the data as only the funds which are widely held, larger and more familiar to the Morningstar 
analysts get Stewardship Grades and only the ones with longer history gets favorable star rating, entailing 
some degree of endogeneity in standard models (Lutton et. al., 2011, p. 4-5) 
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Stewardship Grades are associated with each other for each year (Chi-squared test of 
Contingency Table results not included). 
 
< Insert Table 1 > 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the fund variables that we use in the 
empirical part of this paper. Based on Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Asset Class’ , we divide 
the samples into 5 groups, namely balanced funds, bond funds (‘municipal bond’ or 
‘taxable bond’), ‘international stock funds’, ‘specialty funds’ and ‘U.S. stock funds’. We 
notice that an overwhelming number of funds are of US equity type (624) nearly twice as 
much as the next biggest number of bond funds (315). As expected, expense ratio is 50% 
higher for US equity funds than bond funds and the absolute flow is about two and a half 
times more. Average manager tenure is between 6.5 and 7.5 years. The turnover ratio for 
bond funds (1.08) is nearly 50% more than the US equity funds (0.73). The monthly 
logarithm of age and size are comparable through all categories. 
 
< Insert Table 2 > 
 
The methodology for the Stewardship Grades for funds is independent from the 
Morningstar Star Rating for funds and thus should have no impact on a fund’s Star Rating, 
through better governance might make the fund more attractive (Morningstar Fact Sheet, 
2007). Using the six January samples (2005 to 2011), we compute the Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient between contemporaneous Star Ratings and Stewardship 
Grades. From Table 3 Panel A, in most cases there is at best some weak though statistically 
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significant positive correlation between Star Ratings and components of the governance 
measure. The overall Stewardship Grade and Corporate Culture score are significantly 
correlated with the Star Rating for all the six monthly data.  
In Table 3 Panel B, we perform Granger causality tests with lag length of 2 on the 
raw scores of ratings from the January samples. For the Star Rating, the raw score can be 
estimated as follows 
Raw score for Star Rating (SR) = 







returns of years 10 has fund if     SR 2.0SR 3.0SR 0.5
 returns of years 10-5 has fund if                      SR 4.0SR 0.6
returns of years 5-3 has fund if                                            SR
3510
35
3
  
where SRt is the t-year Morningstar Star Rating. For the Stewardship Grade, the raw score 
is simply the arithmetic average of the scores for the five stewardship component – 
Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ), Manager Incentives (MI), Fees Score (FS) 
and Regulatory History (RH) (cf. Morningstar 2007).  
We find in monthly data that raw Stewardship Grade and raw Star Rating strongly 
Granger cause each other which suggest there is a long term feedback relationship between 
the two variables. This result however has one caveat as Stewardship Grades are quite 
persistent (possibly non-stationary) and Star Ratings are not (i.e., stationary), hence such 
results could be biased. When we examine the difference series of both the Stewardship 
Grades and the Star Rating, we find no evidence of Granger causality. In an ongoing work 
(Ng and Ghosh, 2012) , we explore this interesting finding further by using a rigorous long 
panel data models and dealing with asymptotic results on large cross section (large N) and 
large time series (large T). 
<Insert Table 3> 
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3 Methodology for Ranked Portfolio Tests and Regressions 
Since, Jensen (1969) seminal work on the need for good corporate governance to 
reduce agency problems, scholarly work on corporate governance standards for firms has 
been focusing on a scorecard based approach like the Gompers Index or G Index (Gompers 
et al., 2003). Of the 24 provisions of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) 
that the G-Index focused on, only 6 provisions forming the subsequent Entrenchment or E-
Index turned out to be the main drivers for firm valuation (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 
2009). Some salient features of the main drivers, and the possibly endogenous control 
variables for corporate governance, deserve a re-evaluation.  
First, although opinions are divided whether entrenchment reduces firm value, it 
has been documented that managers of firms with low value are often entrenched, hence it 
is challenging to decipher how much of this entrenchment is causal to the low value of the 
firm (cf. Bebchuk 2002, for a survey). This correlation could be an outcome of the 
simultaneous evolution of firm value and managerial incentives (Bebchuk et al., 2009). We 
account for this endogeneity with the Two-stage Least Squares framework applying 
variables like indicators of managerial ability (e.g., tenure) as instruments. These 
instruments are assumed to affect the variable reflecting firm performance (in the current 
context, the shareholders’ risk adjusted return) only through the Stewardship Grade, i.e., 
satisfy the required exclusion restriction for a valid instrument (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 242, 
eq. 9.3). 
Second, corporate governance for firms is notoriously sticky or persistent. This 
feature has been effectively used to “fill in” interim yearly data between the irregular 
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publications of the IRRC volumes where the governance scores are assumed to essentially 
remain constant (Gompers et al., 2003, Bebchuk et al., 2009). For the current paper, we are 
in a unique position to assess the transitions of the corporate governance scores, both 
monthly as well as yearly. Hence, with the longer time dimension in the longitudinal or 
panel data, we find strong evidence of the simultaneity between our governance score and 
performance measures using Granger Causality tests. This evidence of co-evolution of 
corporate governance in mutual funds and their corresponding performance through 
different business cycles gives us a remarkable insight into their inter-dependence. 
Third, in the current context mutual funds are part of financial sector where the 
major component of the firm performance is risk adjusted return rather than the Tobin’s Q. 
However, the components of Stewardship like Managerial Incentive might be pivotal in 
the performance of the mutual fund for its shareholders. We also observe that limits to 
shareholder control according to the IRRC provisions like staggered board might be 
subsumed within Board Quality and Managerial Incentive, while Golden Parachute will 
most likely be linked with Corporate Culture, Managerial Incentive and Fee Score. Finally, 
Regulatory History probably is also related to Board Quality and managerial incentive. The 
other factors not in the E-Index (for example, Director indemnification and relevant 
contracts, Director’s limited liability and severance packages) might also play significant 
roles (Bebchuk et al., 2009, Lutton et al., 2011). This does put us into a difficult position 
to extract the true components of stewardship protection, we delegate this responsibility 
and seek the advantage of aggregating to an objective or data-driven Stewardship score. 
We propose to use a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based methodology that 
will look at the variation of the entire evaluation dataset to determine the adaptive weights 
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on the components of Stewardship. This reduces the subjective bias that might be affected 
by recent or more noteworthy events. In a way we can call this proposed method a really 
question agnostic and data dependent framework. 
To examine the predictive power of fund ratings, we employ a standard 
methodology in which we study the relation between in-sample ratings of funds with their 
out-of-sample performance, as measured by some standard performance metrics over some 
evaluation period. Our main benchmark is the four-factor model of Carhart (1997):  
itti4ti2ti2ti1ftit εUMDβHMLβSMBβRMRFβαRR     
 
which is an extension of the celebrated Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. In this 
model, tRMRF  is the value of the market return in excess of monthly T-Bill rate (or the 
market risk premium); tSMB  (small minus big factor) is the difference in returns across 
small and big portfolios (or the size premium); tHML  (high minus low factor) is the 
difference in returns between high and low book-to-market equity portfolios (or the value 
premium); tUMD  (monthly momentum factor) is the difference in average returns on two 
high ex-ante return portfolios and two low ex-ante return portfolios (defined as the 
momentum factor or momentum premium).  
The SMB factor which is designed to capture the size effect is based on a portfolio 
comprising a long position in a portfolio of small-cap stocks financed by a short position 
in a portfolio of large-cap stocks. The HML factor which is meant to capture the book-to-
market factor is calculated by building a portfolio that takes a long position in a portfolio 
of high book-to-market (value) stocks and a short position in a portfolio of low book-to-
market (growth) stocks. The UMD factor, described in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), is a 
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momentum factor estimated from a portfolio long in high-momentum stocks and short in 
low-momentum stocks.  
Following the methodology in Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996), we perform a two-
stage procedure to estimate the monthly out-of-sample performance measures of mutual 
funds. In stage 1, for each one-year evaluation period [t – 11, t], we regress each fund’s 
monthly excess return on the monthly four risk factors over 36 months (that is, month  t – 
35 through month t)  prior to the last month of the evaluation period. In the second stage, 
we add the average residuals over one-year prior to and including month t (that is month t 
– 11 to month t) to the estimated intercept term at month t from stage 1 to get the estimated 
one-year out-of-sample measure.  
Our first approach to examining the strength of predictive power of ratings consists 
in forming portfolios by their mutual fund ratings and examining the portfolio mean out-
of-sample performance over a 12-month evaluation (post-rating) period.  Specifically, for 
each month over the period November 2004 (month 1) to May 2010 (month 67), sample 
funds are ranked by one or both of the Morningstar Stewardship Grades (abbrev. SG)  
and/or Morningstar Star Ratings (abbrev SR) and the difference in mean four-factor alpha 
for funds in any two groups is observed. A Newey-West robust  t-test is then performed on 
the time series of differences.  
Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 1 or 2 is in the bottom SR (respectively SG) 
group. Funds with SR (respectively SG) = 5 is in the top SR (respectively SG) group. The 
remaining finds are placed in the middle rating group. Funds in the top SG_SR group are 
those in both top SR and top SG groups. Similarly, funds in the bottom SG_SR group are 
those in both bottom SR and bottom SG groups. The remaining funds are placed in the 
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middle SG_SR group. Similar criteria apply to the five Stewardship Grade components - 
Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ), Manager Incentives (MI), Fees Score (FS) 
and Regulatory History (RH).  
As we seek to find a linear sum of the five stewardship components that possibly 
possesses a stronger predictive power than the overall Stewardship Grade, we employ the 
Principal Component Analysis on the time series of stewardship components to construct 
a new corporate governance score which we name the First Principal Component (FPC). 
Funds are sorted by their FPC and divided into three portfolios - approximately 30% in 
each of the top and bottom groups and the remaining 40% in the middle group.  The next 
step is to compute, for each rating, the difference in mean out-of-sample return of portfolio. 
This produces a time series (from month 1 to month 67) of difference in returns between 
groups 2 and 3 and 1 and 3. We use the symbols 3_2 and 3_1 to denote these differences. 
 Another standard way to assess predictability of ratings is to run a regression of 
out-of-sample return on rating dummies. Blake and Morey (2000) perform a cross-
sectional dummy-variable regression of the form  
Sit =   b T d +  eit   
where Sit (in %) is the out-of-sample performance measure of fund i at time t and d is a 
vector of rating-based binary dummy variables. In their model, d = (d1, d2, d3, d4 ) is a 
vector of binary response variables with dk = 1 if a fund has a Morningstar Star Rating of 
k-star. The best rating group (5-star) is used as the control group. Under the hypothesis that 
rating is predictive, the following condition on the estimated regression coefficients of dk 
hold: 
b1 < b2 < b3 < b4 < 0. 
In this study, we consider the following specification 
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Sit =   b T d + c T x + eit . 
 
Our regression model differs from the preceding in several ways. First, we use the raw 
scores of ratings instead of dummy variables. We estimate different regression 
specifications in which different ratings, including the Star Rating, the overall Stewardship 
Grade, the five stewardship component grades and the First Principal Component grade, 
are used. Second, we include x, a vector of control variables that are found in the literature 
to be potential determinants of fund performance.  
We are mindful that any results on predictability could be driven by factors such as 
fund size and fund age. Control variables in x include prior one year expense ratio and 
turnover ratio reported in the CRSP mutual fund database, prior one month absolute fund 
flow defined as TNAt – (1 + Ri,t-1)TNAt-1 (TNAt and Rt being the total net assets and total 
monthly return provided by CRSP), prior one month natural logarithm of net asset, prior 
one month natural logarithm of fund age (in months), prior one year average manager 
tenure and time dummy variables.  
Third, instead of treating our data as cross-sectional data at different observation 
time, we perform panel data regressions which is known to be more informative than its 
cross-sectional counterparts. We have a unique dataset that provides us with monthly 
values of the overall Stewardship Grade and the five component grades, hence we are able 
to use standard panel data models. Our panel methods help us identify the effect that 
Stewardship Grades as well as the individual components have on standard risk-adjusted 
returns such as the four factor alpha (Carhart, 1997) or a longer-term performance measure 
like Morningstar Star Rating. Finally, for the sake of ensuring the robustness of our results 
and addressing the issue of potential endogeneity, we employ static fixed effect regression, 
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two-stage least square regression and dynamic panel regressions with instrumental 
variables. For a detailed description of these regression models we refer to Wooldridge 
(2010). 
 We repeat the same analysis on our study of the relationship between the two 
Morningstar ratings by regressing Star Ratings on the Stewardship Grade or its component 
grades. As we are dealing with the time series of ratings that are not necessarily stationary, 
especially the Stewardship Grade or its component grade as we have observed from the 
data, we perform unit root tests on both series using their raw scores. As expected, while 
there is no evidence that the Star Rating is non-stationary, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the Stewardship Grade is non-stationary using panel unit root tests (see Baltagi, 2008). 
In fact, when we further test for stationarity of the first order difference of the Stewardship 
score time series, we find that the Stewardship score is not distinguishable from a I(1) or 
non-stationary process.7  
In 2007, Morningstar implemented the following methodology changes to the 
Stewardship Grades: 
1. The weighting on Corporate Culture is increased from 2 to 4 (out of 10) 
2. The requirement that independent directors make up 75% of the board be 
mandatory. 
3. Regulatory history score is changed from a scale of 0- 2 to -2 to 0.  
                                                 
7 These panel unit root tests on monthly data however are based on the assumption that the Stewardship 
Grade is updated as soon as there are any changes in the governance structure. As these grades are followed 
by Morningstar analysts and a report written at least once every year, we cannot be certain of this 
hypothesis (Lutton et. al., 2011). We have ongoing research where we pursue the persistence of the 
Stewardship Grade and its implication on the performance grade relationship (Ng and Ghosh, 2012) 
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We refer the reader to Lutton et. al. (2011) for more details. In view of the above changes, 
we repeat every regression by restricting the sample to data that corresponds to the period 
January 2007 through May 2011.  
We acknowledge the fact that monthly Stewardship Grades might not be updated 
regularly. There is a significant chance that any changes in ratings are probably related to 
the time at which Morningstar team evaluates the component Stewardship scores from both 
direct and indirect sources (Lutton et al., 2011). We also observe a strong persistence of 
Stewardship Grades vis-à-vis the performance measures. We intend to address this issue in 
this paper and a follow-up work on persistence (Ng and Ghosh, 2012).  
 
4 Fund Performance: Out of Sample Predictability and Stewardship Grades 
 
4.1 Out-of-sample Predictability 
Panels A and B of Table 3 elucidate the significant correlation and strong feedback 
loop (or Granger causality) that exists between Stewardship Grade (and its components) 
and Star Rating, it remains to be seen how of this translates into out of sample and long 
term fund performance measured by the weighted risk adjusted returns i.e. the Star-rating. 
Table 4 illustrates the difference in out-of-sample performance of portfolio of funds in 
different groups ranked by their ratings. Applying robust t-tests with Newey-West (HAC) 
standard errors we can infer that the Morningstar Star Rating has a significant and positive 
relation with risk adjusted returns i.e., the one year four-factor alpha. In contrast, when 
ranked by the Morningstar Stewardship Grade in the overall sample period of November 
2004-May 2010 (Table 4 Panel A, Columns SG and SR_SG) the constructed portfolio 
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shows a statistically insignificant but negative on the one year four-factor alpha. This 
unsurprisingly, must have contributed to the conventional wisdom that overall corporate 
governance of mutual funds does not make a significant contribution to fund performance 
in a positive way. Having said that, after the change of methodology in calculating the 
Stewardship grade was introduced in 2007 (Table 4 Panel B), there was an economically 
significant positive effect between the top rated and the bottom rated funds.  
The overall lack of statistical significance is robust to using the First Principal 
Component (FPC) score in place of Stewardship Grades (Table 4, Panels A and B, column 
FPC). When ranked by the both Star rating and FPC score (SR*FPC), we find that even 
the one year four-factor alpha is positive and economically significant comparing portfolio 
that are top third rated and bottom rated funds (Table 4 Panel A and B, column SR*FPC). 
In summary, using Carhart (1997) one-year four factor alpha, we find overall there is  some 
evidence (statistical or economic) that a corporate governance score (even one that is 
objective and data-driven like FPC) based highly rated portfolios would be able to 
consistently outperform a lower rated one without controlling for other factors. 
The results though are significantly stronger when we use a different more long-
term measure of fund performance like the raw star rating score. Portfolios ranked in top 
third of corporate governance score during the ranking period outperform the middle and 
bottom third both statistically and economically significant manner. For the period of 
November 2004 to May 2010, the top third portfolios ranked by previous months 
Stewardship grade outperformed the middle third by between 0.45, while beat the bottom 
third by 0.75 percent. The corresponding outperformance when ranked by the objective 
data-driven FPC score is 0.3 between top and second tercile, and 0.58 between top and 
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bottom tercile portfolios. These results are not just robust but stronger in the subsample 
from January 2007-May 2010. 
Overall, we can infer that when combined with the Morningstar star ratings, the 
standard Stewardship Grade and the proposed FPC score seem to be doing a good job in 
predicting the difference in out-of-sample four-factor alpha between the top and lower 
tercile portfolios ranked by their corresponding ratings.. However, a stronger and a more 
consistent result is that corporate governance scores by themselves seem to be more 
discerning with highest tercile rated portfolios on average outperforming lower rated 
terciles for the long term weighted risk adjusted return like the star rating. 
 
<Insert Table 4> 
 
4.2 Predictive Panel Regressions of Short term Performance and Stewardship 
Predictive performance analysis in Subsection 4.1 indicates that Morningstar Star 
Rating does have a strong impact on the out-of-sample predictability of the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor alpha when separately grouped by Stewardship grades and the First Principal 
Component (FPC) scores. Furthermore, as we observed in Subsection 4.1, the FPC score 
also plays a significant role in determination of the out-of-sample performance in terms of 
both the four-factor alpha and the Star Rating. We would first perform predictive panel 
regressions on the various performance measures including the four-factor alpha, a 
monthly or yearly performance measure, followed by the Star Rating which is a weighted 
long term risk-adjusted performance measure. 
 21 
We perform different specifications of the predictive panel data regression models 
for US Domestic Equity Mutual Funds. Standard fixed effect model for the yearly data 
(collected in December, 2005-2011) assuming strict exogeneity of the regressors would 
result in inconsistent estimators (Wooldridge, 2010). The insignificance of the SG and FPC 
scores in the models might be attributed to the violation of the strict exogeneity assumption 
in these specifications (Table excluded here). 
To address the problem of endogeneity we use two stage least squares estimators in 
the predictive panel regression setting in Table 5 Panel A (Specification EN). The 
instruments used for the static two stage least squares specification includes previous 
period’s values of the average tenure of the manager, the longest tenure of the manager, 
the turnover ratio, the expense ratio and the absolute flow variable. These instruments are 
correlated with the endogenous regressors, Stewardship or FPC scores. Furthermore, these 
instruments only affect the four-factor alpha or the star rating score (i.e., the dependent 
variable) through the explanatory variables satisfying the exclusion restriction (or 
exogeneity) for valid instruments. We have also included the explanatory variables lagged 
values of size and age as instruments to ensure that the necessary rank condition is satisfied.  
From Table 5 model (SR_EN), we observe that the lagged Star Rating does 
continue to have a positive impact on the four-factor alpha and size has a negative and 
significant effect, consistent with findings in Berk and Green (2004) and Bebchuk et. al. 
(2009). Compared to the preceding models, we find that the Stewardship score has a 
significantly positive relation with four-factor alpha in specification (SG_EN). In addition, 
we find once again that fund size has a significantly negative effect on performance. 
Similar results transpire when we replace Stewardship score with the First Principal 
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Component in model (FPC_EN). Thus addressing the inherent endogeneity in the model 
does bring out the effectiveness of corporate governance measures in determining the risk-
adjusted performance of US Equity Mutual Funds. 
With a predictive panel data model, we can exploit the dynamic behavior through 
possible inter-relationship with the lagged four-factor alpha as a covariate. However, given 
only 6 years of data after accommodating for the year lost for constructing the four-factor 
alpha, the results were expected to be weak at best. Even then, we find that in the overall 
model (SGA_DY) after controlling for the lagged dependent variable or lagged four-factor 
alpha, lagged value of the fund size continues to exhibit a significantly negative relation 
with performance. This result holds across all the regression specifications analyzed. 
Surprisingly, we also find that Corporate Culture too plays an economically significant 
negative role in predicting performance. One possible explanation for this minor anomaly 
is that after controlling for past performance (in terms of lagged alpha), Corporate Culture 
seems to create possible managerial entrenchment and generate a negative effect (Brown, 
Harlow and Starks, 1996, Ding and Wermers, 2009, Bebchuck and Cohen, 2004, Bebchuk 
et al., 2009). This finding is also highlighted by a significant negative effect on fund size 
(Berk and Green, 2004). We also observe that lagged four-factor alpha tends to have a 
significant negative impact on future alpha after controlling for other covariates. This effect 
is economically significant in all four dynamic models. Such a negative effect of previous 
period’s risk adjusted performance can signal possible lack of short term persistence and 
possibly “window dressing” activity of mutual funds with poor past returns.. Finally, we 
conclude from models (SG_DY) and (FPC_DY) that although economically significant 
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neither the Stewardship score nor FPC score have a statistically significant positive impact 
on performance after controlling for lagged four-factor alpha. 
Since the methodology for Stewardship Grade was revamped substantially in 2007, 
we re-estimate all the regression models using data over the period on and after 2007. 
Incorporating endogeneity (Models *_EN), results in Panel B are qualitatively similar as 
those in Panel A for the full sample. One of the main differences is that previous period’s 
size although still economically negative, is insignificant statistically. As before in the 
static models (*_EN) accommodating for endogeneity, both Stewardship and FPC score 
turns out to be significant in determining the four factor risk adjusted returns.  
<Insert Table 5> 
 
4.3 Predictive Panel Regressions of Long term Performance and Stewardship 
 
 The main objective of pursuing good governance is to ensure a long-term 
sustainable performance. This necessitates the search of an appropriate measure of 
performance. While the four-factor alpha suffices to be a short term risk adjusted measure 
of mutual fund performance, its single (monthly or yearly) horizon precludes it from being 
a viable measure for long term performance. There are a few reasons for this premise. First, 
an accurate evaluation of the four-factor alpha substantially reduces the data series, 
particularly for a yearly data in which only a few years of Stewardship Grades are 
availability. Second, extant literature established that good mutual fund performance (or 
“hot hands”) is not very persistent (Hendricks et al., 1993, Goetzman et al., 1994, Brown 
et al., 1995). Consequently, using a yearly measure generates a “bounce” which might 
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deviate from longer run objectives. Third, it is not clear how risk adjusted returns of 
different time horizons may be combined into a consolidated long-term performance 
measure, making it a challenge to reach a consensus on the use of such a measure. Finally, 
published ratings data from sources like Morningstar are more readily available to and 
trusted by individual investors than model-based risk adjusted returns. Taking all of these 
into account, a weighted measure of risk adjusted returns of different durations like the Star 
Rating have gained tremendous popularity among both academics and practitioners (Blake 
and Morey,  2000, Wellman and Zhou, 2007, Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008). 
 With a long-term investment objective in mind, we prefer to analyze the raw Star 
Rating measure with respect to a corporate governance score and other control variables in 
a predictive panel data setting. To address the possible endogeneity issue that can make the 
estimated coefficients inconsistent, we use two stage last squares on more parsimonious 
models described in Table 6 Panel A specifications (EN). Instruments used are lagged 
values of stewardship scores, average and longest manager tenure, log(age), expense ratio, 
log(size), turnover ratio and fund flows. The included endogenous regressor variables are 
Stewardship scores components (Model SGA_EN), the Stewardship score itself (Model 
SG_EN) or the FPC score (Model FPC_EN). In model (SGA_EN) we observe, none of the 
stewardship components has statistically significant effect on Star Rating which might be 
related to possible multicollinearity. We also observe that size and turnover ratio have a 
positive but insignificant impact on Star Rating. In the Model (SG_EN), lagged size has a 
significant negative impact on Star Rating or weighted long- term performance consistent 
with the findings of Berk and Green (2004). 
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In Model SG_EN (and FPC_EN), both the Stewardship score (and FPC score) and 
turnover ratio have a positive and significant impact on Star Rating. However, lagged size 
has statistically significant negative coefficient for the full sample. We can reconcile the 
somewhat counter-intuitive result on turnover by noting that Star Rating is a long-term 
measure of past performance which might not be affected by recent active portfolio 
management. Besides, the relationship between portfolio turnover and fund performance 
has been a controversial issue. For example, both Carhart (1997) and Malkiel (1995) 
document a negative association between fund performance and turnover. But results from 
Grinblatt and Titman (1994) and Wermers (2000) report a positive relation between 
performance and turnover, thus suggesting that active trading can be positive for fund 
performance (for an international perspective, see Rao, 2010). 
In the dynamic panel data model for yearly data (Table 6 Panel A Specification 
DY), we find past Star Rating play a significant positive role in all models (SGA_DY, 
SG_DY and FPC_DY). We also observe that size play a significant negative role, while 
turnover plays a negative economically significant role after adjusting for past star rating. 
Both the Stewardship score in model (SG_DY) and the FPC score in model (FPC_DY) are 
significantly and positively associated with Star Rating when we control for past Star 
Ratings. Considering that we are using only six years of data, this result further 
corroborates our view of the inherent long- term relationship between Star Rating and 
corporate governance of the mutual funds. Results in Table 6 Panel B Specifications EN, 
which are based on data taken on or after 2007, are qualitatively the same as those reported 
in Panel A on the whole sample. 
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As annual reports and financial statements are released once a year, we cannot 
expect the components of Stewardship Grades to change more frequently than that. 
However, as we have a wide cross section and different funds have different dates of release 
of financial statements and quarterly updates, we can assume that some variation in the 
monthly data on Stewardship Grades exists despite its persistence. With the variation of 
the Star Rating per month, and its dependence on the current Stewardship scores, it is 
worthwhile to explore the structural dependence of the two measures in the monthly panel. 
Furthermore, due to the availability of a longer monthly series, our analysis can also focus 
on co-evolution of the two processes controlling for other factors.  
To address non-exogeneity of the explanatory variables we employ the two stage 
least squares technique for panels with instruments given by twice lagged dependent 
variable and lagged values of average manager tenure, longest manager tenure, turnover 
ratio, expense ratio, log of size and fund flows. In Model (SGA_EN) we find that only Fee 
Scores has negative and significant coefficient, while other components are positive and 
significant in explaining star rating. Turnover ratio is positive and significant, and size has 
also has a positive impact. Interestingly, when we replace individual stewardship 
component grades with the Stewardship score (or FPC score), the coefficient of size turns 
negative and significant.   
One exciting part about the monthly data is that the number of observations on time 
domain is sufficiently large to do a complete analysis of the time series in the dynamic 
panel context. For the Model (SGA_DY), in the presence of the lagged dependent variable 
star rating, all coefficients of the stewardship components were significant, although Board 
Quality, Corporate Culture and Fee Score turned out to be negative in the full sample. We 
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also find that although lagged size is positive, lagged age has a strong negative impact on 
Star Rating consistently for all three dynamic models. In addition, we also find that being 
in financial crisis year (2008) was significantly negative for the Star Rating. In examining 
the shorter sample series from January 2007 to May 2011 (Table 6 Panel D) using static, 
endogenous and dynamic models, we find similar results.  
In the data series with the revised methodology for Stewardship scores, our 
proposed objective data-driven First Principal Component (FPC) score reduces the 
dimensionality problem and shows a strong positive significance in models with the more 
subjective Stewardship score (Table 6 Panel D). We also find a consistently positive effect 
of turnover, size, average manager tenure and absolute flow, and a negative effect of 
expense ratio. 
In our naïve models where we treat the fund specific variables as exogenous, we 
are assuming that these variables have a direct impact on the dependent variable: Star 
Rating. However, we can always argue that these variables are affecting the Star Rating 
through some other variables like the Stewardship. Hence, it might be more meaningful to 
include variables that are associated with stability (manager tenure), cost of running the 
fund (expense ratio) and reputational impact (fund flow) as instruments on direct variables 
like fund size and turnover ratio. Our two stage least squares on the subsample after 2007 
shows significant negative impact of size (consistent with Berk and Green, 2004) while 
maintaining a positive impact on the Stewardship variable (models FPC_EN and SG_EN). 
However, turnover appears to assert a positive impact on Star Rating when composite 
Stewardship variable (SG or FPC) rather than individual components is used.  
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With the monthly panel from 2007, we can apply the Arrelano and Bond (1991) 
methodology to evaluate the effect of differences in the Stewardship components and 
composite indices on the Star Rating without facing a dimensionality problem caused by a 
short time dimension. We see from Table 6, Panel D model (SGA_DY) that controlling for 
lagged raw Star Rating score, turnover, size and age, the entire set of stewardship 
components are significant although BQ, CC, FS and MI have negative effects. Lagged 
age seems to have a negative significant impact on Star Rating controlling for the 
difference of funds fixed effects. 
Considering that Stewardship components are persistent, we proceed to explore 
whether changes in Stewardship could be more informative. It turns out that with the 
exception of Corporate Culture and Managerial Incentive, the first order difference of all 
stewardship component scores have a negative and significant impact, controlling for past 
rating, size, age and turnover (Model DSGA_DY). Similar analysis with our proposed FPC 
score reveals that while the lagged FPC as expected has a positive and significant impact 
on Star Rating, the lagged first difference of FPC has a negative significant effect after 
controlling for lagged Star Rating, turnover, age and size (Models FPC_DY and 
DFPC_DY). We further observe that other than turnover ratio which continues having 
positive effect, variables like size, age and the indicator for the crisis period all have a 
significant negative impact on Star Rating. These results are more or less corroborated in 
the results based on models (SG_DY) and (DSG_DY).  
We reckon that due to strong persistence of the corporate governance structure, any 
changes in these ratings are taken to be highly informative to the investing public and the 
effect gets reflected heavily in long term investment while controlling for past Star Rating. 
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Hence, as opposed to the stock variable reflected in the stewardship score itself, changes 
in the score might communicate past problems in management and induce a negative 
overreaction. 
To check for persistence in the Star Rating, we use two lags of the Star Rating 
(Model FPC_DY2). Our results suggest that the Star Rating has a lasting effect. As 
expected, size, age and crisis period have significant negative impact on Star Rating while 
turnover ratio shows a positive relation. 
 
5  Conclusions 
According to the 2012 Investment Company Factbook, ownership of mutual funds 
by U.S. households hit 44% in year 2011 compared with less than 6% two decades ago. As 
of the end of 2011, the number of mutual funds in the U.S. market exceeded 19000 while 
the number of mutual funds available worldwide was close to 73000. Given the multitudes 
of funds that small institutional investors and retail investors have to choose from, they 
often rely on mutual fund ratings like the Morningstar Star Rating to guide their investment 
decision. This throws us back to the long standing problem of evaluating future unobserved 
performance based on past performance, a practice which can be detrimental to the long-
term financial well-being of investors.  
The objective of this paper is simple, and really two-fold. First, we evaluate the 
predictability of performance after controlling for other factors. Second, we 
comprehensively uncover the relationship of performance, both short-term (like a risk 
adjusted performance measure like the Carhart’s four factor alpha) and long-term (like 
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Morningstar Star Rating), with some non-return-based performance measures related to the 
specific funds.  
 This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first rigorous attempt to examine 
two popular and influential strands of research on mutual fund ratings – Morningstar’s Star 
Rating and Stewardship Grade – in a comprehensive and econometrically robust manner. 
To examine the predictive power of the ratings, we conduct a ranked portfolio test and 
predictive panel regressions for both monthly and annual data.  
Our investigations lead to several key findings. First, all our empirical results 
unequivocally indicate that a good Star Rating is associated with good one-year post-rating 
risk-adjusted return. Second, we further show that after adjusting for endogeneity using a 
two stage least squares approach, we find a strong and unmistakable link between 
Stewardship score or our proposed FPC score, and separately for both short term (four 
factor alpha) and long term performance (Star Rating) measures. Third, using a dynamic 
panel model, we evaluate how a corporate governance score such as the Stewardship 
Grade, is still strongly and positively significant in the presence of past Star Ratings. This 
substantiates the link claimed between governance and performance for mutual funds.   
Our research shows that Morningstar Star Stewardship score (or better still, the 
proposed FPC score) provides a powerful tool for fund selection, just like the Star Ratings. 
This study helps provide investors with some useful insights into the relation of two 
seemingly unrelated ratings. 
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TABLE 1 
Frequency Distribution of Morningstar Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
 
Panel A. Frequency Table of Morningstar Ratings for January Sample of Year 2004 – 2010  
This panel reports the percentage of funds that receive the various Morningstar Star Ratings (1-star 
(Worst) to 5-star (Best)) awarded in the month of January for year 2005 - 2011. Numbers in (      ) 
indicate percentages. 
 
Star Rating 
Year 1-star 2-star 3-star 4-star 5-star N 
2005 16  (1.93) 113  (13.68) 285  (34.5) 276  (33.41) 136  (16.46) 826 
2006 19  (2.04) 155  (16.66) 328  (35.26) 302  (32.47) 126  (13.54) 930 
2007 34  (3.24) 177  (16.87) 376  (35.84) 330  (31.45) 132  (12.58) 1049 
2008 30  (3.13) 185  (19.35) 340  (35.56) 292  (30.54) 109  (11.4) 956 
2009 57  (6.58) 177  (20.46) 326  (37.68) 208  (24.04) 97  (11.21) 865 
2010 44  (5.45) 169  (20.94) 294  (36.43) 222  (27.5) 78  (9.66) 807 
2011 58  (6.7) 162  (18.72) 326  (37.68) 224  (25.89) 95  (10.98) 865 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Panel B. Frequency Table of Stewardship Grades for January sample of Year 2004 – 2010 
This panel reports the percentage of funds that receive the various Stewardship Grades (F (Worst) 
to A (Best)) awarded in the month of January for year 2005 - 2011. Numbers in (      ) indicate 
percentages. 
 
 Stewardship Grade  
Year F D C B A N 
2005 30  (3.63) 90  (10.89) 230  (27.84) 408  (49.39) 68  (8.23) 826 
2006 19  (2.04) 80  (8.6) 285  (30.64) 459  (49.35) 87  (9.35) 930 
2007 10  (0.95) 86  (8.19) 348  (33.17) 498  (47.47) 107  (10.2) 1049 
2008 30  (3.13) 195  (20.39) 441  (46.12) 230  (24.05) 60  (6.27) 956 
2009 32  (3.69) 157  (18.15) 427  (49.36) 196  (22.65) 53  (6.12) 865 
2010 25  (3.09) 118  (14.62) 391  (48.45) 200  (24.78) 73  (9.04) 807 
2011 7  (0.8) 142  (16.41) 407  (47.05) 238  (27.51) 71  (8.2) 865 
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Panel C. Two-way Frequency Table of Stewardship Grades and Star Ratings for January 
Sample of Year 2004 – 2010 
This panel reports the two-way frequencies for Stewardship Grades and Star Ratings received by 
funds as of month of January for year 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011. Numbers in (      ) indicate 
percentages. (We omit results for 2006, 2008 and 2010 due to conserve space) 
   Star Rating 
Year N 
Stewardship 
Grade 1-star 2-star 3-star 4-star 5-star 
2005 826 F 1  (0.12) 3  (0.36) 18  (2.17) 5  (0.6) 3  (0.36) 
  D 0 16  (1.93) 43  (5.2) 20  (2.42) 8  (0.96) 
  C 8  (0.96) 52  (6.29) 93  (11.25) 60  (7.26) 17  (2.05) 
  B 4  (0.48) 37  (4.47) 116  (14.04) 165  (19.97) 86  (10.41) 
  A 0 5  (0.6) 15  (1.81) 26  (3.14) 22  (2.66) 
        
        
2007 1049 F 0 6  (0.57) 1  (0.09) 3  (0.28) 0 
  D 5  (0.47) 24  (2.28) 38  (3.62) 17  (1.62) 2  (0.19) 
  C 17  (1.62) 91  (8.67) 136  (12.96) 74  (7.05) 30  (2.85) 
  B 11  (1.04) 46  (4.38) 167  (15.91) 192  (18.3) 82  (7.81) 
  A 1  (0.09) 10  (0.95) 34  (3.24) 44  (4.19) 18  (1.71) 
        
2009 865 F 4  (0.46) 7  (0.8) 12  (1.38) 7  (0.8) 2  (0.23) 
  D 16  (1.84) 44  (5.08) 64  (7.39) 25  (2.89) 8  (0.92) 
  C 25  (2.89) 93  (10.75) 164  (18.95) 99  (11.44) 46  (5.31) 
  B 11  (1.27) 23  (2.65) 67  (7.74) 65  (7.51) 30  (3.46) 
  A 1  (0.11) 10  (1.15) 19  (2.19) 12  (1.38) 11  (1.27) 
        
        
2011 865 F 0 1  (0.11) 2  (0.23) 1  (0.11) 3  (0.34) 
  D 19  (2.19) 35  (4.04) 49  (5.66) 25  (2.89) 14  (1.61) 
  C 29  (3.35) 87  (10.05) 160  (18.49) 97  (11.21) 34  (3.93) 
  B 10  (1.15) 32  (3.69) 87  (10.05) 74  (8.55) 35  (4.04) 
  A 0 7  (0.8) 28  (3.23) 27  (3.12) 9  (1.04) 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Fund Variables 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of important fund variables used in this study. The sample consisting of funds classified as ‘U.S. Stock’ , ‘International Stock’ , 
‘Specialty’, ‘Bond’ (‘Taxable Bond’ or ‘Municipal Bond’) and ‘Balanced’ funds under Morningstar’s ‘US Broad Category’ Classification)  receive Stewardship Grades 
(abbrev. SG) (including each of the five stewardship components) and the Star Ratings (Abbrev SR) in December 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 November 2004 – 
May 2011. We report the time series averages of the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation and number of funds. 
 
 
 
 Balanced Funds  Bond Funds  International Stock Funds  Specialty Funds  U.S. Stock Funds 
 Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
log(age in mth) 5.3683 0.6290 110  5.3795 0.4482 315  5.0461 0.4293 213  5.2276 0.4730 13  5.2097 0.5725 624 
Expense Ratio 0.0083 0.0049 110  0.0074 0.0034 315  0.0129 0.0046 213  0.0123 0.0055 13  0.0111 0.0042 624 
Absolute  Fund 
Flows (in mil) 
12.2943 340.0523 110  3.0699 277.3657 315  25.6994 543.2236 212  -2.5658 28.7420 13  -7.3041 229.1272 621 
Average Manager 
Tenure 
6.5834 4.9476 107  7.5845 5.4973 315  6.2438 3.9193 213  7.9215 4.5291 13  7.5199 5.3072 624 
Turnover ratio 0.6645 0.6046 110  1.0801 1.7108 315  0.6601 0.7053 213  0.6154 0.6746 13  0.7303 0.6040 624 
log(size in mil) 6.9439 1.7365 110   6.6896 1.3813 315   6.6019 1.7866 213   6.4433 1.0002 13   6.5347 1.6467 624 
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Table 3 
Correlation and Granger Causality Relation between Star Rating and 
Stewardship Grades 
Panel A  Correlation of Star Rating with Stewardship Grade and its Components  
This table reports the correlation between the Star Rating and the Stewardship Grade (SG) and each of the 
Stewardship Grade components - Corporate Culture (CC), Board Quality (BQ) ,  Manager Incentives (MI), Fees 
Score (FS) and Regulatory History (RH)  for the January sample of  2005 , 2007, 2009  and  2011 (we omit results 
for 2006, 2008 and 2010  to conserve space) 
 
January 2005 
(N=826)  
January 2007 
(N=1049)  
January  2009 
(N=865)  
January 2011 
(N=865) 
SG 0.27183  0.28052  0.19043  0.17891 
 (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01) 
BQ 0.23148  0.25559  0.04808  0.0048 
 (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (0.1578)  (0.8879) 
FS 0.17368  0.1345  0.05052  -0.01846 
 (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (0.1377)  (0.5877) 
MI 0.04744  0.01121  0.11455  0.20896 
 (0.1732)  (0.7170)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01) 
CC 0.2898  0.30522  0.17222  0.21621 
 (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01) 
RH 0.19754  0.22287  0.16411  -0.01057 
 (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (< 0.01)  (0.7564) 
  
Panel B  Pairwise Granger Causality Test on raw scores of Star Rating (SR) and Stewardship Grade (SG) 
This table reports the F-statistics and p-value (in parentheses) of Pairwise Granger causality test (lag length 2) 
between Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades or  individual stewardship component grade using monthly time 
series data from the January 2005 – January 2011. 
Variable SR GC Variable Variable GC SR 
SG 10.0908*** 9.5923*** 
 (< 0.01) (< 0.01) 
BQ  0.97223  4.91146*** 
 (0.3782) (< 0.01) 
CC  18.2667***  6.67852*** 
 (< 0.01) (< 0.01) 
FS  1.63902  2.19359 
 (0.1942) (0.1115) 
MI  13.5747***  0.51167 
 (< 0.01) (0.5995) 
RH  2.57021  8.99095*** 
 (0.0765) (< 0.01) 
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Table 4. Ranked Portfolio Tests 
This table reports results of the statistical tests for difference in mean monthly one-year out-of-sample 
performance measure (one-year four factor alpha or star rating raw score) between two rating groups. For each 
month over the period November 2004 (month 1) to May 2010 in Panel A and January 2007 to May 2010 in Panel 
B, sample funds are ranked by one or both of the Morningstar Stewardship Grades (abbrev. SG)  and/or 
Morningstar Star Ratings (abbrev SR) and the difference in mean one-year out-of-sample four-factor alpha for 
funds in two rating groups is observed. A Newey-West adjusted t-test is performed on the time series of 
differences. Funds in the top SGSR group are those in both top SR and top SG groups. Similarly, funds in the 
bottom SG_SR group are those in both bottom SR and bottom SG groups. The remaining funds are placed in the 
middle SG_SR group. For the First Principal Component (FPC) of the Stewardship Grade factors, funds in the 
top, middle and bottom group (approximately 30% in each of the top and bottom groups and the remaining 40% 
in the middle group) are ranked 3, 2 and 1 respectively. symbols 3_2 and 3_1 denote the difference in mean 
performance measures between the top and middle and between top and bottom groups respectively.  Numbers in 
parentheses are the Newey-West adjusted t-test (4 lags) standard errors. The symbols *, ** and *** denote 
respectively significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Panel A.  Ranking Period: November 2004  –  May 2010  
  Out-of-sample Performance Measure 
  One-year four factor Alpha  Star Rating Raw Score 
Difference  SR SG SR_SG FPC SR_FPC  SG FPC 
3_2  0.0248* -0.0233 -0.0686 0.0139 0.0213  0.4509*** 0.3071*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0157) (0.0496) (0.0180) (0.0294)  (0.0357) (0.0249) 
3_1  0.0946*** -0.0094 -0.0445 -0.0056 0.0566  0.7490*** 0.5887*** 
  (0.0239) (0.0305) (0.0473) (0.0151) (0.0361)  (0.0366) (0.404) 
 
Panel A. Ranking Period: January 2007  – May 2010  
  Out-of-sample Performance Measure 
  One-year four factor Alpha  
Star Rating Raw 
Score 
Difference  SR SG SR_SG FPC SR_FPC   SG FPC 
3_2  0.0324* 0.0017 0.0157 0.0354 0.0624**  0.4103*** 0.2823*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0202) (0.0458) (0.0253) (0.0305)  (0.0452) (0.0335) 
3_1  0.1313*** 0.0089 0.0216 -0.0040 0.0774*  0.7140*** 0.4863*** 
  (0.0241) (0.0455) (0.0435) (0.0241) (0.0441)  (0.0513) (0.0290) 
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Table 5 
Regressions of Risk-adjusted Returns on Mutual Fund Ratings 
 
We  report estimates of  regressions to examine the extent to which Morningstar’s stewardship grades and/or star ratings predict future return using yearly data 
from December 2005 (respectively December 2007) through December 2010 in Panel A (respectively Panel B). The regression specification is        
                                                           
Sit =  bT Ratingit +  c T x + eit. 
 
Sit (in %) is the one-year Carhart’s four-factor alpha. Ratingit is a vector of variables which include one or more of the following mutual fund ratings variables: 
lagged raw score of star rating (SR), lagged raw score of stewardship grade (SG), lagged raw score of the five stewardship components –  corporate culture 
(CC), board quality (BQ) ,  manager incentives (MI), fees Score (FS) and regulatory history (RH), and the First Principal Component (FPC) score derived from 
the stewardship component scores via principal component analysis. x is a vector of control variables known to be related to mutual fund performance. Control 
variables in x include lagged expense ratio and turnover ratio obtained from the CRSP mutual fund database, lagged fund flow, lagged logarithm of fund total 
net asset (in millions), lagged logarithm of fund age (in months) and lagged four factor alpha. We estimate three different models, each with various 
specifications involving a different set of independent variables.    
 
(Model Specification EN) Two-stage least squares regression model. The instrumental variables used here include prior(one-year) values of the following variables : 
average manager tenure, longest manager tenure. fund flows,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio.  
(Model Specification DY)  Dynamic panel model. Instrumental variables used in various specifications are as follows. For specification (SGA_DY): prior one-year 
and two-year values of Sit, prior one-year values of each of:  average manager tenure, longest manager tenure. Fund flows,  log (age), 
expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio; for specifications (SR_DY) , (SG_DY) and (FPC_DY):  prior one-year values of each of:  average 
manager tenure, longest manager tenure. Fund flows, log (age), expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio 
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Panel A (December 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 US Equity Funds) 
      (Model Spec EN)    (Model  Spec DYN) 
Explanatory Variables   (SR_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN)   (SGA_DY) (SR_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY) 
Intercept   -0.1418** -0.5565** -0.5233**       
   (0.0983) (0.2220) (0.2175)       
lagged BQ        -5.0945    
        (4.0169)    
lagged CC        -2.051    
        (3.756)    
lagged FS        1.5513    
        (2.3830)    
lagged MI        -1.5619    
        (1.416)    
lagged RH        -1.6243    
        (1.6255)    
Lagged SR raw score   0.0617      0.0511*   
   (0.0402)      (0.0880)   
lagged SG raw score    0.1134**      0.4091  
    (0.0489)      (0.3401)  
lagged FPC     0.2547**      0.2160 
     (0.1134)      (1.2094) 
lagged FF alpha        -0.3509*** -0.7581* -0.8813** -0.7421** 
        (0.0957) (0.2418) (0.3573) (0.3554) 
lagged turnover ratio   -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0017   0.0176 -0.0004 -0.0036 -0.0020 
   (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0012)   (0.0139) (0.0007) (0.0023) (0.0040) 
lagged size   -0.0147** -0.0388** -0.0367**   -0.5873*** -0.3291*** -0.2007 -0.2982 
   (0.0068) (0.0193) (0.0188)   (0.1547) (0.0651) (0.2049) (0.2307) 
lagged age            
            
Fixed Time Effect   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect   No No No   No No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect 
(Difference) 
 
 No No No   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N   626 531 531   500 500 500 500 
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Panel B (December 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
  (Specification EN) 
  (SR_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN) 
Intercept  -0.1675 -0.6342* -0.5233* 
   (0.1351) (0.3237) (0.2175) 
lagged BQ     
      
lagged CC     
      
lagged FS     
      
lagged MI     
      
lagged RH     
      
Lagged SR raw score  0.0628   
  (0.0589)   
lagged SG raw score   0.1355*  
    (0.0746)  
lagged FPC    0.2547** 
     (0.1134) 
lagged turnover ratio  -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0017 
   (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
lagged size  -0.0117 -0.0497 -0.0367 
   (0.0098) (0.0304) (0.0188) 
lagged age     
      
Fixed Time Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect  No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect 
(Difference)  No No No 
N 
  
626 
 
525 
 
525 
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Table 6 
Regressions of Morningstar Star Ratings on Overall/Component Stewardship Grades 
 
We report estimates of regressions to examine the relation between Morningstar star rating and prior period stewardship grades or stewardship component 
grades. In Panel A (respectively B), yearly data from the December samples spanning 2005 (respectively 2007) through 2010 is used. In Panel C (respectively 
D), monthly data from November 2004 (respectively January 2007)  through May 2011  is used.  The regression specification is 
SRit =   bT Ratingit +  c T x + eit. 
SRit is the Morningstar star rating of fund i at year t.. Ratingit is a vector of variables that are one or a combination of the following mutual fund ratings variables: 
lagged raw score of star rating (SR), lagged raw score of stewardship grade (SG), lagged raw score of the five stewardship components –  corporate culture 
(CC), board quality (BQ),  manager incentives (MI), fees Score (FS) and regulatory history (RH), and the First Principal Component (FPC) score derived from 
the stewardship component scores via principal component analysis. x is a vector of control variables known to be related to mutual fund performance. Control 
variables in x include lagged turnover ratio obtained from the CRSP mutual fund database, lagged logarithm of fund total net asset (in millions), lagged average 
and longest manager tenure, lagged logarithm of fund age (in months) and lagged absolute fund flow. We estimate three different models, each with various 
specifications involving a different set of independent variables.    
 
Yearly Regression (Panel A and B) 
 
(Model Specification EN) Two-stage least squares regression model. For (SGA_EN), the instrumental variables used here include prior one-year average manager 
tenure, longest manager tenure,  fund flows,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size), turnover ratio, expense ratio 
 and all five stewardship component grades  (BQ, CC, FS, MI and RH). For (SG_EN), instruments used are prior one-year average manager 
tenure, longest manager tenure,  fund flows,  log (age), turnover ratio and expense ratio 
(Model Specification DY) Dynamic Panel model.  Instrumental variables used in various specifications are as follows. For all specifications, instruments used are  
prior one-year and two-year  raw scores of SR and prior one-year average manager tenure, longest manager tenure, fund flows,  log (age), 
log(size) , turnover ratio and expense ratio 
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Monthly Regression Panel C and D  
(Model Specification EN) Two-stage least squares regression model. For (SGA_EN), the instrumental variables used here include prior one-month values 
of the following variables: first principal component of stewardship grades, average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  
log (age), expense ratio, log(size) and turnover ratio. For (FPC_EN) and (SG_EN), instruments used are prior one-month values 
of the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  log (age), expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio 
and fund flows. 
(Model Specification DYN ) Dynamic Panel model   
 
Panel C Instrumental variables used in various specifications are as follows. For specification (SGA_DY): prior one-month, prior one- and two-month raw star rating 
raw scores, prior one-month values of the following variables: board quality score, corporate culture score, fee score, manager incentive score, regulatory 
history score, average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio and fund flows.   and For (SG_DY): prior one- and 
two-month raw star rating raw scores, prior one-month values of the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, 
log(size) , turnover ratio and fund flows. For specification (FPC_DY): prior one- and two-month raw star rating raw scores, prior one-month values of the 
following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio , fund flows and a dummy that takes a value of 
1 if the time period is in or after January 2007. 
Panel D Instrumental variables used in specification (FPC_DY) are prior one- and two-month raw star rating raw scores, prior one-month values of the following 
variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio , fund flows and a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
time period is in or after January 2007.   Instrumental variables used in all other specifications are prior one- and two-month raw star rating raw scores, prior 
one-month values of the following variables: average manager tenure, longest manager tenure,  expense ratio, log(size) , turnover ratio and fund flows 
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Table 6 
Regressions of Morningstar Star Ratings on Overall/Component Stewardship Grades 
 
Panel A (December 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
   (Specification EN)  (Specification DY) 
      (SGA_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN)   (SGA_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY) 
Intercept   -2.3316 -1.4026*** -1.2679***     
   (9.4294) (0.1599) (0.1639)     
lagged BQ   -6.1152    1.5233   
   (8.5596)    (1.5346)   
lagged CC   -3.1755    -0.5023   
   (7.9687)    (0.9719)   
lagged FS   0.2201    1.6888   
   (2.8163)    (1.3333)   
lagged MI   1.2526    -0.1882   
   (2.0506)    (0.8381)   
lagged RH   8,9256    0.8795   
   (13.6769)    (0.6528)   
lagged SG raw score    0.7440***    0.7020**  
    (0.0489)    (0.3014)  
lagged FPC     1.7034***    1.7134*** 
     (0.1036)    (0.5547) 
lagged SR raw score       0.1980*** 0.4947*** 0.4447*** 
       (0.0715) (0.0544) (0.0520) 
lagged Turnover ratio   0.0109 0.0087** 0.0040  -0.0055 -0.0024 -0.0047* 
   (0.0354) (0.00394) (0.0043)  (0.00522) (0.0025) (0.0027) 
lagged size   0.2388 -0.0913*** -0.0803***  -0.1940** -0.2969*** -0.2561*** 
   (0.1843) (0.0332) (0.0250)  (0.0859) (0.0654) (0.0615) 
lagged avg manager tenure          
          
lagged longest manager tenure          
          
lagged absolute flows          
          
lagged age          
          
Fixed Time Effect   Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect   No No No  No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference)          No No No          Yes Yes Yes 
N          536 536 536         508 508 508 
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Panel B (December 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 Samples) 
   (Specification EN)  (Specification DY) 
      (SGA_EN) (SG_EN) (FPC_EN)   (SGA_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY) 
intercept   1.1733 -1.4776*** -1.344***     
   (3.8057) (0.2432) (0.1106)     
lagged BQ   -2.8588    3.5513*   
   (4.6754)    (1.9048)   
lagged CC   0.1352    -2.1204   
   (2.4047)    (1.7410)   
lagged FS   -0.5677    2.3248   
   (0.6533)    (2.5091)   
lagged MI   0.6922    2.2919   
   (0.5085)    (1.1419)   
lagged RH   2.6490    1.6128   
   (5.1095)    (1.7169)   
lagged SG raw score    0.7894***    1.2171***  
    (0.0717)    (0.4386)  
lagged FPC     1.7953***    2.8346*** 
     (0.1061)    (0.8100) 
lagged SR raw score       0.1574 0.4355*** 0.3427*** 
       (0.1062) (0.0763) (0.0675) 
lagged turnover ratio   0.0076 0.0032 -0.0015  -0.0082 -0.0057 -0.0093** 
   (0.0225) (0.0028) (0.0042)  (0.0071) (0.0036) (0.0042) 
lagged size   0.1655 -0.1388*** -0.1120***  -0.2375 -0.3617*** -0.2996*** 
   (0.1517) (0.0382) (0.0288)  (0.1544) (0.0919) (0.0816) 
lagged avg manager tenure          
          
lagged longest manager tenure          
          
Absolute flows          
          
Age          
          
Fixed Time Effect   No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect   No Yes Yes  No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference)  No No No          Yes Yes Yes 
N  527 527 527            501 501 501 
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Panel C (Monthly Samples From November 2004 to May 2011) 
Dependent variable: star rating Raw Scores (SRRaw) Sample : Dec 2004 to May 2011 
 
 (SGA_EN) (FPC_EN) (SG_EN)  (SGA_DY) (FPCDcrisis_DY) (FPC_DY) (SG_DY) 
intercept 1.2182*** -1.8985*** -1.6111***      
      (0.0174) (0.0900) (0.0480)      
lagged BQ 0.3079***    -0.0129***    
 (0.0157)    (0.0001)    
lagged CC 0.1799***    -0.0287***    
 (0.0160)    (0.0008)    
lagged FS -0.1336***    -0.0593***    
 (0.0080)    (0.0035)    
lagged MI 0.1687***    0.0189***    
 (0.0120)    (0.0003)    
lagged RH 0.1815***    0.0911***    
 
(0.0115)    (0.0008)  
 
 
lagged SG raw score  1.8644*** 0.7531***     0.0013*** 
  (0.0444) (0.0137)     (1.32E-06) 
lagged FPC      0.0023*** -0.0055  
      (1.61E-06) (0.0384)  
lagged SR raw     0.6930*** 0.6933*** 0.6936*** 0.6883*** 
     (0.0001) (1.61E-05) (0.0006) (8.69E-06) 
Lagged turn ratio 
0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0088***  0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0011 0.0005*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009)  (4.41E-05) (7.68E-07) (0.0023) (1.45E-06) 
lagged size 0.1405*** -0.0668*** -0.0729***  0.0552** 0.0348*** 0.0377#* 0.0587*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0076) (0.0077)  (0.0003) (1.25E-05) (0.0178) (1.52E-06) 
Lagged age     -0.5264*** -0.4127*** -0.2080 -0.4293*** 
     (0.0017) (8.80E-05) (0.5198) (1.18E-05) 
D_crisis      -0.0597*** -0.0413  
      (0.0011) (0.0204)  
FPC*D_crisis      0.0042***   
 
     
 (3.12E-05) 
 
 
         
Fixed Time 
Effect 
Yes Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund 
Effect 
No No No   No No No 
Fixed Fund 
Effect 
(Difference) 
No No No   Yes No No 
N  625 625 625   588 588 588 
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Panel D (Monthly Samples From January 2007 to May 2011) 
 
  Specification EN 
  (SGA_EN) (FPC_EN) (SG_EN) 
intercept  1.2202*** -2.0980**** -1.5869*** 
  (0.0330) (0.0952) (0.0697) 
lagged BQ  0.2408***   
  (0.0203)   
lagged CC  0.1391***   
  (0.0181)   
lagged FS  -0.1750***   
  (0.0049)   
lagged MI  0.2125***   
  (0.0146)   
lagged RH  0.1793***   
  (0.0188)   
lagged SG raw score    0.7654*** 
    (0.0179) 
lagged FPC   1.9864****  
   (0.0472)  
lagged turnover ratio  0.0038*** 0.0010 0.0060*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
lagged size  0.1550*** -0.0935**** -0.1004*** 
  (0.0029) (0.0089) (0.0090) 
lagged expense ratio     
     
lagged avg manager tenure     
     
lagged absolute flows     
     
Fixed Time Effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Fund Effect  No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference)  No No No 
 
N  607 607 607 
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Panel D (contd.) 
Dependent Variable : star rating Raw Scores. Sample: Jan 2007 to May 2011 
 (Specification DY) 
 (SGA_DY) (DSGA_DY) (DFPC_DY) (DSG_DY) (FPC_DY) (SG_DY) (FPC_DY2) 
lagged BQ -0.0413***       
 (0.0003)       
lagged CC 0.0047***       
 (0.0006)       
lagged FS -0.0257***       
 (0.0002)       
lagged MI -0.0136***       
 (0.0003)       
lagged RH 0.1059***       
 (0.0009)       
lagged SG raw score      0.0095***  
      (3.74E-05)  
lagged FPC     0.0275****  0.0182*** 
     (0.0026)  (0.0073) 
lagged SR raw score 0.7433*** 0.7459*** 0.7434*** 0.7457*** 0.7441**** 0.7441*** 0.6749*** 
 (7.60E-06) (0.0001) (1.10E-05) (2.03E-05) (0.0005) (6.90E-05) (0.0013) 
lagged SR raw score (lag 2)       0.1448*** 
       (0.0002) 
Lagged First Difference of BQ  -0.0268***      
  (0.0003)      
Lagged First Difference of CC  0.0254***      
  (0.0013)      
Lagged First Difference of FS  -0.0477***      
  (0.0002)      
Lagged First Difference of MI  0.0069***      
  (0.0002)      
Lagged First Difference of RH  -0.0879*      
  (0.0008)      
Lagged First Difference of FPC   -0.0655****     
   (4.75E-05)     
Lagged First Difference of SG raw score    -0.0271***    
    (2.46E-06)    
lagged turnover ratio 0.0006*** 0.0003*** 0.0005 0.0003*** 0.0008**** 0.0006*** 0.0013*** 
 (1.29E-07) (6.50E-06) (3.59E-06) (2.47E-07) (0.0001) (3.61E-07) (0.0004) 
lagged size 0.0384*** 0.0402*** -0.0013*** 0.0406*** 0.0096**** 0.0430*** -0.0368** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (3.41E-05) (5.47E-06) (0.0019) (1.04E-05) (0.0006) 
lagged age -0.5558*** -0.3897*** -0.4220*** -0.3911*** -0.4531**** -0.4412*** -0.3814*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0006) (6.72E-05) (8.51E-05) (0.0062) (2.40E-05) (0.0171) 
D_crisis(-1)   -0.0430*  -0.0505****  -0.0431*** 
   (0.0001)  (0.0023)  (0.0226) 
 
Fixed Time Effect 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
Fixed Fund Effect No No No No No No No 
Fixed Fund Effect (Difference) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 560 558 558 558 560 560 560 
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Appendix: Principal Component of Stewardship Components 
 
 
In our empirical analyses, the FPC (First Principal Component) is calculated from a monthly sample of funds (December 2004 – 
December 2010. Specially, we calculate the first principal component (FPC) based on each of the following seven monthly data sets: 
Dec 2004 – Nov 2005, Dec 2004 – Nov 2006, …., Dec 2004  – Nov 2010. 
 
 
 
                        Monthly Samples (U.S. Stock Funds) 
SG Component  Dec 04 – Nov 05 Dec 04 – Nov 06 Dec 04 – Nov 07 Dec 04 – Nov 08 Dec 04 – Nov 09 Dec 04 – Nov 10  
BQ  0.50 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.40  
CC  0.63 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.66  
FS  0.29 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.32  
MI  0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11  
RH  0.51 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.53  
 
